Abstract. According to an interesting and thought-provoking article by Natalie Ashton and Robin McKenna, Paul Boghossian in Fear of Knowledge would have presented a “classical”, “objectivist” view of epistemic justification, which allegedly excludes “that social factors can determine what counts as evidence”. On the basis of this interpretation, the two authors find that a feminist history of science, which shows how certain societal advancements in the position of women did, actually, lead to the acceptance of certain (previously available) data as evidence for a given theory, would run counter to that classical view. I argue that Ashton and McKenna overlook the crucial difference between the merely descriptive tenet “social factors determine what data epistemic subjects take, in fact, to be evidence for a given theory” and the normative tenet “social factors determine what data can legitimately be taken to be evidence for a given theory”. Under the descriptive interpretation, the history they tell is clearly not incompatible with the “classical view”. And under the normative interpretation, a second ambiguity emerges: when social factors are supposed to “determine” what data can legitimately count as evidence, is this a rational or a causal sense of “determine”? Given that the authors themselves admit, relative to the specific story they tell, that we have an independent criterion (explanatory power) which justifies that we take certain data as justification for a given belief, then the only sense of “determine” which remains is the causal one−and in this sense, once again, the story they tell is perfectly compatible with a “classical view” of justification.