This talk is an homage to Robert’s ability to formulate a trenchant objection. Eleven years ago, I was on a pre-doctoral fellowship at NESCent, and the philosophy of biology reading group, one quiet Tuesday evening, was chatting about the paper that Grant Ramsey and I had published on the concept of fitness (Pence and Ramsey 2013). Being a contribution to the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF) literature, it proposed that fitness is a dispositional property of individual organisms, realized as an organism – with a particular genome and placed in a particular environment – lives its life. In the way that Robert can do so well, he leaned back in his chair during discussion and mused off-hand that perhaps a disposition like that – one that’s constantly in the process of realization, where the classic distinction between the disposition, its categorical basis, and its manifestation conditions is difficult to draw – might not make metaphysical sense. I do not know whether he thought it was a serious or potentially fatal objection at the time, but it has haunted my quiet moments for eleven years. This paper is an effort to exorcise the ghost, an attempt to respond – finally – to what I still take to have been one of the best objections yet offered to work that, itself, was firmly placed in the tradition of Robert’s own Adaptation and Environment.